Altruism, borrowing constraints, and social security by David Altig & Steve J. Davis
Working  8918 
ALTRUISM,  BORROWING CONSTRAINTS, 
AND SOCIAL SECURITY 
by David Altig and Steve J.  Davis 
David Altig is an assistant professor at the 
Graduate School of Business, Indiana 
University,  and a visiting scholar at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.  Steve J. 
Davis is an associate professor at the 
Graduate School of Business,  University of 
Chicago.  The authors wish to thank Andy 
Abel,  Doug Bernheim, Jim Davies,  participants 
in the NBER Conference on Social Insurance, 
and workshop participants at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, the Hoover 
Institution,  and UCLA for helpful comments on 
earlier versions of this paper.  They also 
thank Jim Klopfenstein  for providing 
excellent programming assistance.  Much of 
the research for this paper was carried out 
while Steve J. Davis was a National Fellow at 
the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. 
The authors gratefully acknowledge the 
financial support of the Hoover Institution 
and the Summer Research Grant Program at the 
Graduate School of Business, Indiana 
University.  Davis also thanks the National 
Science Foundation for its support through a 
grant to the National Fellows Program at the 
Hoover Institution. 
Working papers of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Cleveland are preliminary materials 
circulated to stimulate discussion and 
critical comment.  The views stated herein 
are those of the authors and not necessarily 
those of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Cleveland or of the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System. 
December 1989 Abstract 
We show how intergenerational altruism and borrowing constraints shape 
the interest rate,  savings, and welfare response to funded and unfunded social 
security programs.  Borrowing constraints pin down the optimal timing of 
altruistic intergenerational transfers and thereby alter the implications of 
intergenerational altruism for fiscal policy.  Regardless of whether 
parent-to-child altruistic transfer motives operate, borrowing constraints 
imply effects of social security programs that deviate greatly from the 
effects in Ricardian and traditional life-cycle environments.  If,  however, 
child-to-parent  altruistic gift motives operate in at least some families, 
social security programs are neutral in their impact on the interest rate, 
though not necessarily in their impact on consumption.  This interest-rate 
neutrality result holds regardless of whether borrowing constraints bind,  . 
regardless of whether parent-to-child transfers operate, and regardless of 
whether exchange motives for intergenerational transfer are important. 1. Introduction 
- 
The imgications of  mandatory social security programs for the interest rate, for ag- 
gregate capital accumulation, and for economic welfare hinge critically on the nature and 
extent of intergenerational linkages and capital market imperfections. In this paper we de- 
velop the implications of social security when capital market imperfections take the form 
of  an inability to borrow against future wage (or social security) income and altruism moti- 
vates intergenerational linkages.  Within an overlapping generations framework populated 
by  three-period-lived persons, we  characterize the dynamic and steady-state response to 
funded and unfunded social security interventions. We  consider the implications of bind- 
ing borrowing constraints, parent-to-child altruistic transfer motives, and child-to-parent 
altruistic gift motives.  A central theme of  our analysis is that borrowing constraints and 
intergenerational linkages jointly determine the response to social security programs. 
The interaction between borrowing constraints and intergenerat ional altruism is also 
a central theme in the analysis of  government debt  by  Altig and Davis  (1989a) and in 
the analysis of  wealth accumulation and intergenerational transfer  patterns by  Laitner 
(1989).  Aside from its focus on social security, this paper differs from our earlier work 
in  three respects.  First, we  identify all equilibrium configurations of  intertemporal and 
intergenerational linkages that can arise in our overlapping-generations framework.  We 
find six equilibrium configurations, one of  which corresponds to the standard life-cycle 
model with perfect capital markets,  and one of  which  corresponds to Barro's  dynastic 
model. Second, we analytically characterize the dynamic and steady-state effects of  social 
security intervent ions on the capit  a1 stock when borrowing constraints bind.  Our earlier 
work relied entirely on numerical simulations to characterize the capital stock response to 
nonneutral government debt policies. 
Third, we prove that an operative child-to-parent gift motive (pre- and post-intervention) 
implies neutrality of  the steady-state interest rate with respect to all lump-sum govern- 
ment interventions, including all social security interventions. This interest-rate neutrality 
result holds regardless of whether borrowing constraints bind and regardless of  whether 
the young and middle-aged are connected by  altruistic linkages.  It also survives the intro- 
duction of  non-altruistic agents into the economy, provided that the gift motive continues 
to operate for the altruists.  It follows that, unlike neutrality results in the Barro-Becker- BernheimIBagwell tradition, our interest-rate neutrality argument does not rely on direct 
or indirect aitruistic linkages  between persons who are taxed  and/or subsidized in  the 
government intervention.  Our analysis of  social security complements work  on  the in- 
teract  ion between imperfect annuity markets and intergenerat  ional linkages by  Kotlikoff 
and Spivak (1981), Sheshinski and Weiss (1981), Eckstein, Eichenbaum, and Peled (1985), 
Abel  (1985,1986), and Kotlikoff, Shoven, and Spivak  (1987).  We  show  that borrowing 
constraints significantly alter the aggregate savings response to unfunded social security 
programs relative to the response in traditional life-cycle models like Feldstein (1974), Kot- 
likoff (1979), and Auerbach and Kotlikoff  (1987) and relative to the response in models 
with intergenerational altruism and perfect capital markets like Barro (1974).  We  also 
show that Hubbard and Judd's  (1987) argument for shifting the generational incidence 
of  social security  payroll taxes away from younger workers is greatly weakened  by  the 
introduction of a small degree of  intergenerational altruism. 
Underlying much of  our analysis is ,a simple proposition regarding the interaction 
between borrowing constraints and intergenerational altruism:  borrowing constraints pin 
down  the optimal timing of  altruistically motivated intergenerational transfers.  Specifi- 
cally, if  children are borrowing-constrained when young and parents make positive trans- 
fers,  parents make all transfers early in  the life cycle.  This timing proposition carries 
important implications for fiscal policy in economies with altruistic agents. 
The determinate timing of  intergenerational transfers implies that parents need not 
be connected to their children through operative linkages over the entire life cycle.  Par- 
ents' marginal utility of  consumption when old can exceed the discounted marginal utility 
of  childrens' consumption when middle-aged - parents would choose to transfer resources 
from their children (and grandchildren) to themselves if  a transfer mechanism was avail- 
able. Unfunded social security provides such a transfer mechanism. Thus, unfunded social 
security interventions are nonneutral when borrowing constraints bind, despite altruisti- 
cally motikted transfers from parents to children early in the life cycle.  Of  course, the 
borrowing constraints that drive the timing result also break the intertemporal  (capital 
market) link between young and old persons. Hence, funded social security interventions 
that impinge on the budget constraints of  the young are also nonneutral. 
Our results are usefully juxtaposed against well-known results in the literature.  As stressed by  Feldstein  (1974), an unfunded social  security program  depresses  aggregate 
savings aid  the capital stock  in  a  pure life-cycle environment characterized by  perfect 
capital markets and an absence of  intergenerational transfers.  Barro (1974) shows that, 
when capital markets are perfect,  the existence of  altruistically  motivated  intergenera- 
tional transfers implies the complete neutrality of  an unfunded social security program. 
(Other motives for intergenerational transfers carry profoundly different implications for 
the aggregate savings response to unfunded social security programs; see, for example, Cox 
(1987) and Bernheim, Schliefer, and Summers (1985).) We  show that the introduction of 
binding borrowing constraints leads to quantitatively significant departures from the Ri- 
cardian benchmark, even when parents make altruistically motivated transfers to children. 
Indeed, the capital stock decline caused by  an unfunded social security program is often 
larger in an environment with altruistic agents and borrowing constraints than in envi- 
ronments with (a) non-altruistic agents and perfect capital markets or (b) non-altruistic 
agents and borrowing constraints. 
2.  The Overlapping-  Generations Framework 
A. A Perfect Capital-Markets Economy and  a No-Loan Economy 
We describe an overlapping generations framework with three-period-lived persons and 
no government, postponing the discussion of  fiscal policy variables to section 4.  Within 
this framework we consider an economy with perfect capital markets and an economy with 
no consumption-loans market.  Each person in these economies inelastically supplies ho- 
mogeneous labor services according to a lifetime productivity profile, (al,  a2, a3).  Parents 
choose the timing and magnitude of  altruistically-motivated transfers to children.  (We 
defer consideration of  child-to-parent gift motives to section 6.)  Output is produced from 
capital and labor inputs according to a neoclassical production function. 
We  assume  -  that an individual's productivity profile is hump-shaped, so that a2 > 
crl and  a2 > a3.  We  have shown elsewhere (Altig and Davis, [1989a]) that a life-cycle 
income profile that slopes up over the first two periods of  life greatly reduces the degree of 
altruism necessary to generate transfers from parents to children. To make our discussion 
of borrowing restrictions nontrivial, we further assume that a2  is sufficiently greater than 
a1 so that the consumption-loans market  influences the equilibrium capital stock and consumption profile.  In other words, we  focus on parameter configurations in which  the 
equilibrim- capital stock  and consumption profile differ between the loan and no-loan 
economies. 
In the consumption-loans economy with no government, a representative member of 
generation t chooses (Cit,  C2t, C3t, zit, x2t, bl,t+i, b2,t+l, b3,t+l) to maximize: 
subject to: 
Cit + zit = aiWt +  bit,  (2) 
C2t + (1  + n)bi,t+i +  ~2t  = (1  + rt+i)zit + azWt+i +  b2t,  (3) 
C3t + (1  + n) (b2,t+l + b3,t+l) = (1  + rt+2)~2t  + (1  + rt+2)b3t + a3Wt+2,  (4) 
Clt, C2t, C3t, bl,t+l, b2,t+l, b3,t+l L 0,  (5) 
where: 
Clt = consumption by generation t when young, 
C2t = consumption by generation t when middle-aged, 
C3t = consumption by generation t when old, 
zit = capital purchases (i.e., savings) by generation t when young, 
xzt = capital purchases by generation t when middle-aged, 
bilt+i  = transfer  made by  a generation-t parent  to each (1 + n) offspring in  the 
children's ith period of  life (an inter vivos transfer for i = 1,2, a bequest for i = 3), 
p = intertemporal discount factor, 0 < p < 1, 
7 = interpersonal discount factor, 0 < 7 _< (1  + n)/P,  which insures a positive steady-  - 
state interest rate when the transfer motive operates in the loans economy, 
u(.) = period utility function, satisfying ut(.) > 0, u"(.)  < 0, limc,o  ut(C) = oo,  and 
lime,,  ut(C) = 0, 
U[+l  = maximum utility attainable by a generation t + 1 agent as a function of  the 
transfer received, n = the population growth rate, 
Wt =-theperiod-t wage in units of  the good, and 
rt+l = the one-period rate of  return on physical capital (or consumption loans) held 
from t to t + 1. 
The absence of nonnegativity constraints on savings by the young and middle-aged reflects 
the availability of  a costless consumption-loans market. 
In the no-loan economy a representative consumer of  generation t maximizes (1) sub- 
ject to (2) thru (5) and 
Xlt, x2t  L 0.  (6) 
This additional constraint reflects the absence of  a viable enforcement mechanism to sup- 
port  the operation of  a consumption-loans market.'  We  show  below  that, assuming the 
young choose to dissave in the consumption-loans economy, the constraint xlt 2 0 always 
binds in the corresponding no-loan economy. 
Turning to the production side of  the two economies, and normalizing so that gener- 
ation 0 has one member, the aggregate period-t labor supply is 
where a! is per capita labor supply.  Defining k = K/L  as the capital-labor ratio, we  write 
the aggregate production function as 
where f'(-)  > 0, f 'I(.) < 0, limk,o  f '(k) = oo, and limk,,  ft(k) = 0. The representative 
firm's competit  ive profit maximization conditions are 
Wt = f (kt) -  ktf '(kt),  and  (9) 
lThe constraint  (6) has more than one interpretation.  First, borrowing constraints can 
arise from high costs of  enforcing loan repayment,  due partly to bankruptcy laws and 
other  legiil. protections afforded  to debtors.  Second, the asymmetric tax treatment  of 
interest income and interest payments on consumption loans can lead consumers to choose 
a corner outcome with respect to their borrowing and saving decision (see Altig and Davis 
[1989b]). Third, and somewhat further removed from our framework, sufficiently severe 
adverse selection effects can prevent the operation of  a consumption-loans market.  For 
empirical evidence on the incidence of  binding borrowing constraints, see Zeldes  (1989) 
and references therein. The &&et-clearing  conditions complete the specification of the two  models.  We 
obtain the goods market-clearing condition: 
I 
C2,t-1  C3,t-2 
Kt+l -  Kt + (1  + n)'  Clt +  + 
(1  + n)2 
C2,t-1  C3,t-2  =+ a(1  + n)kt+l -  akt + Clt + -  + 
1+n  (1+n)2  = af  (kt), 
and the capital market-clearing condition: 
=+ kt = (1  + n)~i,t-I+  ~2,t-2  +  b3,t-2 
(1  + n)2a  (12) 
This completes the description of  the loan and no-loan economies with no government. 
To introduce the government, one need only add the government budget constraint and 
make appropriate modifications to the consumer budget constraints and the goods market- 
clearing condition. 
B. The Consumer's  Optimization Problem 
The consumer's intertemporal first-order conditions for own consumption are 
Equations (13)  and (14)  hold with equality in the loan economy, and in the no-loan economy 
when equation (6) fails to bind.  In these cases, equations (13) and (14) represent the 
familiar condition that the marginal rate of substitution between own current consumption 
and own future consumption equals the time-discounted gross rate of  return to savings. 
Using the envelope  theorem,  the first-order conditions governing  intergenerat ional 
- 
transfers are 
7  I  uf(C,t)  2 -u  (Ci-l,t+l) i = 2,3 
l+n  (15) 
for inter vivos transfers and for bequests.  Equations  -.  (15) and  (16) state that when a transfer motive is  operative, 
the discou6tgd-marginal  rate of  substitution of  the parent's  consumption  for 
consumption equals the population -deflated interpersonal discount factor. 
C.  Equilibrium 
An equilibrium in the consumption-loans economy is a sequence 
{Clt, C2,t-1, C3,t-2, ~lt,~2,t-i,bit,  b2,t-1,  b3,t-2, Wt,rt+i,kt,  Yt)&-,  that satisfies equations 
(1)-(5) and (7)-(16) for all t, given the initial condition  (x~,--~,  x2,-2, kO). Similarly, an 
equilibrium in the no-loan economy is a sequence 
{Clt, C2,t-1, C3,t-2, x2t,blt,b2,t-1,b3,t-2,Wt,rt+l,kt,Yt)~~  that satisfies equations  (1)- 
(16) 
We  note one additional definitional  matter here.  In  the perfect  capital- markets 
economy  with an operative transfer motive, the timing of  intergenerational transfers is 
indeterminate-parents and children care only about the present value of  intergenerational 
transfers.  Because the timing of  transfers is indeterminate, the volume of  activity in the 
consumption-loans market is indeterminate. These indeterminacies have no bearing on the 
equilibrium capital stock or consumption profile, but they are a potential source of  con- 
fusion in characterizing the influence of  the consumption-loans market on the equilibrium 
outcome.  We  use the term "active consumption-loans market" to refer to an economy 
with an active consumption- loans market in  every equilibrium, including the equilibrium 
in which parents make all transfers during their second period of  life. 
With this definition in  mind, we  now  state a preliminary proposition.  Assuming 
uniqueness of  the steady-state equilibrium in the loan economy, we have 
Proposition 1:  If  the consumption-loans market is active in the loan economy, borrowing 
constraints bind in the corresponding no-loan economy. 
Proof: Follows directly from equation (13) and from the uniqueness assumption. 
- 
The result in Proposition 1 is independent of  whether the transfer motive operates. Thus, 
intergenerational transfers can never be large enough to overcome 'borrowing restrictions 
when dissaving is optimal in the steady state of  the loan economy.2 
21t is possible for transfer motives to be strong enough in the loans economy to eliminate 
the young's desire to dissave. In this case the consumption-loans market is redundant and One further preliminary proposition will prove useful in the analysis below. 
Propositio-:  Let f and  ? denote steady-state interest  rates in  the loan  and no-loan 
economies, respectively. 
(a) If the transfer motive operates in the loan economy, then 
-  (l+n)  r =  -  1 G r*. 
7P 
(b) If  borrowing constraints bind in the no-loan economy, then F < r*. 
Proof:  Part (a) follows immediately by combining the equality versions of  equations (13) 
and (15). Part (b) follows by combining the strict inequality version of  (13) with (15). 
Part (a) of  this proposition contains the standard result for the dynastic model, showing 
that the steady-state capital stock satisfies the modified golden rule.  Part (b) states that 
binding borrowing constraints drive the steady-state capital stock above the level implied 
by the modified golden rule, regardless of  whether the transfer motive operates. 
3.  Borrowing Restrictions and the Timing of Transfers 
A. The  Optimal Life-Cycle Timing of  Altruistic ~knsfers 
We  turn now to a discussion of  the optimal life-cycle timing of  intergenerational trans- 
fers in the no-loan economy.  While the budget expressions in equations (2)-(4) allow for 
any combination of  inter viva transfers and bequests, we  show that transfers early in the 
life cycle dominate transfers later in the life cycle.  We  begin by  proving 
Proposition 3:  If  the consumption-loans economy has an active consumption-loans market, 
then bequests and inter vivos transfers from the old to the middle-aged equal zero in the 
corresponding no-loan economy. 
Proof:  Suppose bequests or  transfers from the old  to middle-aged are positive.  Then 
equations (14)-(16) imply that 
- 
(1+n)  r =  -  1 = r*. 
P7 
But, by Propositions 1 and 2(a), (P3) violates the hypothesis of  an active loan market. 
the loans and no-loans equilibria are identical. In light of  Proposition 1,  we  can interpret Proposition 3 to say:  if  borrowing con- 
straints bind-an the young, then parents make no bequests upon death or transfers when 
old.  Can binding borrowing constraints on the young co-exist with positive transfers by 
middle-aged parents? Applying Proposition 2, the answer is yes.  When the transfer motive 
operates, the steady-state marginal rate of substitution between consumption by the young 
and consumption by the middle-aged equals y.  But by Proposition 2,  exceeds 
the young's desired marginal rate of  substitution in the na-loan economy.  Hence, positive 
transfers from middle-aged parent to young child can co-exist with binding borrowing con- 
straints on the young. Indeed, we show in Altig and Davis (1989a) that binding borrowing 
constraints weaken  the conditions under which parents make transfers to children.  We 
summarize this discussion in 
Proposition 4: If  borrowing restrictions bind in a steady-state equilibrium, then any inter- 
generational transfers occur from middle-aged parents to young children. 
B. Patterns of  Intertemporal  and Intergenerational Linkages 
Using Proposition 4, we now describe the patterns of  intertemporal (capital market) 
and intergenerational linkages that can emerge as steady-state equilibria in the no-loan 
economy.  The following simple diagrams illustrate these patterns and show the relation- 
ship of  our environment with binding borrowing constraints to traditional life-cycle and 
Ricardian  environment^.^ 
Patterns of  Intertemporal and Intergenerational Linkages 
Regime  A.  hop. Trans.  B.  Op. Trans.  C. hop. Trans.  D.  Op. Trans. 
Borr.  Const.  Borr.  Const.  Perf. Cap. Mkt.  Perf. Cap.  Mkt. 
Time  t  t+l t+2  t  t+l t+2  t  t+l t+2  t  t+l t+2 
Generation 
Young  0.0  OTT  I  - 
mid-aged  y,,,  t 
old  I  '.  'b 
Dashed lines in the diagram depict altruistically motivated intergenerational linkages, and 
We  thank Doug Bernheim for suggesting this expositional device. solid lines depict intertemporal linkages operating through the capital market.  More pre- 
cisely, a Rnk-eonnecting two dots indicates that the relevant first- order condition holds 
with equality. 
Regime C in the diagram corresponds to a pure life-cycle economy with perfect capital 
markets.  Regime D depicts the Ricardian environment, characterized  by perfect capital 
markets and an operative transfer motive.  Regimes C and D represent the range of equilib- 
rium linkage patterns in the loan economy.  When the borrowing constraint is non-binding, 
these two regimes can also arise in the no-loan economy.  Two other linkage patterns arise 
in the no-loan economy when borrowing constraints bind. The linkage pattern in Regime 
A arises when borrowing constraints bind and the transfer motive is inoperative. The link- 
age pattern in Regime B, which reflects the result in Proposition 4, arises when borrowing 
constraints bind and transfers are positive. 
Proposition 1 informs us that Regime B always emerges  (in the new steady state) 
when borrowing constraints are imposed on a Ricardian environment with an active loan 
market. Altig and Davis (1989a) show that either Regime A or B can arise when borrowing 
constraints are introduced into Regime C. 
4. The Capital-Accumulation Effects of Social Security 
In this section we  analytically characterize the capital accumulation effects of  social 
security interventions when borrowing constraints bind.  As  in Diamond (1965), the key 
ingredients of  the analysis  are an aggregate savings function and a stability condition 
that characterizes the dynamic behavior of  the economy along the transition path to a 
steady-state equilibrium. 
A.  Social Security Interventions 
Let Tiyt  denote lump-sum taxes (subsidies, if  negative) levied on members of generation 
t during the ith period of  life.  Let  dt  denote the time-t issue of  one-period government  - 
debt per middle-aged person.  The government budget constraint is 
We  define a funded social security intervention as a forced savings program that pays a market rate of  return. That is, a funded social security program obeys 
Note that the government runs a budget surplus under a funded social security program. 
We  define an unfunded or pay-as-you-go social security intervention as a forced inter- 
generational transfer program that satisfies 
Note that, in a steady state, unfunded social security programs offer the individual a rate 
of return equal to the population growth rate. 
B.  The Private-Sector Savings Function 
We  first derive the savings function of  the middle-aged in an economy with binding 
borrowing constraints  and no transfers.  Defining z2t + dt+1 = st+l, use the budget 
constraint equations (3) and (4) to write equation (14) as 
This equation implies the existence of  a savings function for the middle-aged, 
with partial derivatives satisfying 
> 
0 < sl < 1,  -1 < s2 < 0,  s1 -  (1 +rt+2)s2 = 1,  and  s3  <O.  (21) 
Thus, in  the no-transfer economy, savings by  the middle-aged is an increasing function 
of  after-tax labor income during middle-age and a decreasing function of  after-tax labor 
income during old age.  Savings by  the middle-aged increases (decreases) in the interest 
rate if  t he-substitution (income) effect dominates. 
In  the transfer economy the savings function has similar properties, but its deriva- 
tion is  more complicated.  From the transfer-motive first-order condition (15) and the 
intertemporal first-order condition (14), we  have where  $(a)  is  -.  the inverse marginal utility function, and lCll  > 0.  Using this expression for 
Cl,t+l anid Mte  household budget constraints, we write equation (14) as 
This equation implies a savings function for the middle-aged, 
with partial derivatives satisfying equation (21). 
The form of  these savings functions is  easily understood in  terms of  the analysis 
in section 3.  Recall the pattern of  intertemporal and intergenerational  linkages in  the 
no-transfer economy with binding borrowing constraints-at the margin, the middle-aged 
are connected only to their own old age.  Thus, as equation (20) indicates, social security 
directly affects the savings behavior of the middle-aged only insofar as it alters their current 
taxes or their anticipated old-age benefits. In the transfer economy with binding borrowing 
constraints, the middle-aged are also connected at the margin to their young children. 
Thus, in line with equation (22), changes in social security taxes levied on their children 
when young also directly affect the savings behavior of  the middle-aged. 
C.  Stability Analysis 
We  now  combine the private-sector savings function,  the government  budget con- 
straint, and the capital market-clearing condition to characterize the dynamic behavior of 
the aggregate capital stock. .The evolution of  the aggregate capital stock between t + 1 
and t + 2 obeys 
&(I+  n)2kt+2 = ~t+l(.,.,.)  -  dt+l = st,,,  (23) 
where St+l  denotes the aggregate savings function at t +  1. st+l(.,  ., .)  is given by equation 
(20) in the netransfer economy and equation (22) in the transfer economy. 
~~Gation  (23) implies a relationship between kt+2 and kt+l that, following Diamond, 
we  refer to as the savings locus.  Differentiate equation  (23) to obtain the slope of  the 
savings locus, 
-anal  kt+lf1'[kt+l) 
a(l+n)2-a3a2kt+2  fl1(r,+z)-a3  fll(kt+2) 9  in the no-transfer economy; 
-[al  (l+n)+az]al  kt+lf"(kt+~)  in the transfer economy.  (24) 
a(i+n)2-asa2kt+2f0(kt+2)-~3f11(kt+2)' The numerator-is unambiguously positive, but the denominator can be positive or negative. 
If  as = 0, so-that the old supply no labor services, the middle term in the denominator 
vanishes, and the expression for the slope of the savings locus has exactly the same form 
as in Diamond. 
What does equation  (24) imply about the transition path to the steady-state equi- 
librium?  Restricting attention to stable steady states, there are two cases to consider. 
If  0  <  dkt+2/dkt+l < 1 (in the neighborhood of  the steady-state  equilibrium),  then 
the capit  a1 stock converges monotonically to its steady-state value.  Alternatively, if  0 > 
dkt+2/dkt+l > -1,  then the capital stock oscillates around the steady-state value along 
the transition path. Savings loci corresponding to the monotonic and oscillatory transition 
paths are illustrated by curves A and B, respectively, in Figure 1. 
Equation  (24) not  only characterizes  dynamic behavior along the transit  ion  path, 
but it determines  the steady-state capital stock  response to nonneutral social security 
interventions.  This is  an example of  Samuelson's  (1947) correspondence principle.  As 
we show in Appendix 1, when the denominator in equation (24) is positive, the partial 
equilibrium response of  aggregate savings to social security interventions carries over, in 
qualitative terms, to the general equilibrium effect.  In contrast, when the denominator 
in equation (24) is negative, the partial equilibrium effect of  social security on aggregate 
savings is reversed in general equilibrium.  Hence, we refer to steady-state equilibria that 
satisfy 0 < dkt+a/dkt+l < 1 as stable and regular. 
D. Linkage Patterns and the Efects of  Social Security 
We  are now  prepared to characterize the effects of  social security interventions on 
capital accumulation when the borrowing constraint binds.  We  first describe the steady- 
state effects. 
Proposition 5:  Consider the overlapping-generations framework with binding borrowing 
constraints on the young. Assume that the steady-state equilibrium is stable, regular, and 
unique (pre- and post-intervention)  . 
(a) A funded social security system financed by taxes on the middle-aged has no effect on 
capital accumulation. 
(b) A funded social security system financed by taxes on the young increases the steady- Figure 1 
The Savings Locus and Steady-State Equilibrium state (per capita) capital stock. 
(c)  An unfunded social security system decreases the steady-state capital stock. 
(d) If the transfer motive operates, the generational incidence of the taxes used to finance 
old-age benefits under an unfunded system is irrelevant to the determination of the. 
capital stock.  If  the transfer motive is inoperative, a shift in taxes from the middle- 
aged to the young increases the capital stock. 
Proof:  See Appendix 1. 
If  we  drop the uniqueness assumption in  Proposition 5, then the results apply in some 
neighborhood of  the initial steady-state equilibrium. If  we drop the regularity assumption, 
then the qualitative responses to nonneutral interventions are reversed. 
The intuition  behind Proposition  5 can  be  understood  as follows:  The neutrality 
result in part (a) reflects the intertemporal link between the middle-aged and the old in 
Regimes A and B. Since the middle-aged are already trading-off own current consumption 
for own future consumption at the rate (1 + r), they fully offset the funded social security 
intervention.  In this respect, the borrowing-constraint economies mirror the behavior of 
the standard life-cycle economy depicted in the diagram by Regime C. 
Likewise, the irrelevance result in part (d) of  the proposition for the transfer economy 
reflects the intergenerational link between the middle-aged and young as illustrated in the 
diagram for Regime B.  When the transfer motive operates, the young and middle-aged 
are trading-off consumption at the rate (1  + n), which is identical to the trade-off implied 
by shifts in the generational incidence of  taxes under an unfunded social security system. 
This logic holds regardless of  whether the young are borrowing-constrained. 
Turning to the nonneutral interventions, consider a funded social security program 
financed by a one dollar tax on each young person. There are distinct impact and secondary 
effects here, both of  which lead to an increase in the capital stock. First, aggregate saving 
rises because the government forces each of  the (1 + n) young persons to save one dollar. 
This impact effect  is  mitigated,  but not  reversed, when  the transfer motive operates, 
because middle-aged parents adjust transfers to partially compensate the young for their 
disposable income loss.  Hence, when the transfer motive operates, the partial equilibrium 
impact effect on aggregate savings is (1  +  n) (1 -  sl)  . Second, after the funded program has 
been in operation for more than one period, each middle-aged person experiences a (1  +  r) dollar increase in own wealth over the last two periods of  life.  This effect leads to a further 
increase in &regate  savings in the amount of (1  +  r) times the marginal propensity to save 
out of  middle-aged income. Thus, in the no-transfer economy, the partial equilibrium effect 
is to increase aggregate savings by (1  +  n)  +  sl(l+ r).  In the transfer economy, the partial 
equilibrium effect is to increase aggregate savings by only (1  +  n)(l -  sl)  +  sl(l+  r).  The 
regularity condition, 0  < dkt+2/dkt+l < 1, insures that these partial equilibrium effects 
carry over to the general equilibrium. In terms of  Figure 1,  the aggregate savings locus A 
shifts up and to the left. 
Now, consider the effects of  an unfunded social security program. An unfunded social 
security program weakens the life-cycle motive for saving by shifting the timing of  income 
receipt to a later period of  life.  The increase in after-tax income during old age leads to 
a partial equilibrium reduction in aggregate savings.  This is the only effect when taxes 
fall entirely on the borrowing-constrained young and the transfer motive is inoperative. 
If  taxes fall on the young and the transfer motive operates, then altruistic transfers from 
the middle-aged to the young rise.  Hence, the net-of-transfer income of  the middle-aged 
falls, and there is a further depressive effect on aggregate savings.  If  the tax falls on the 
middle-aged, then the decline in the after-tax income of  the middle-aged is an additional 
effect contributing to the reduction in savings.  Under all of  these scenarios, an unfunded 
social security program depresses savings. 
Note the sharply contrasting implications of  altruistic intergenerational  linkages in 
the loan and no-loan economies.  With perfect capital markets, altruistic transfers are the 
mechanism that neutralizes the aggregate savings effects of  an unfunded social security 
program.  With binding borrowing constraints on the young, altruistic transfers exacer- 
bate the decline in  aggregate savings relative to the no-transfer case.  This additional 
depressive effect on aggregate savings reflects the efforts by altruistic parents to offset the 
reduction in after-tax income of  their borrowing-constrained children.  Thus, the fiscal 
policy implications of altruistic intergenerational linkages hinge critically on the issue of 
whether borrowing constraints bind. 
We  can use Proposition 5 to draw a sharp distinction between our no-loan economy 
with operative transfers and that of  Laitner (1989). In our no-loan economy,  the non- 
neutrality of unfunded social security programs entirely reflects the effects of  government- mandated transfers between persons who are members of  the same family line.  Further- 
more, in regime B, nonneutrality holds despite altruistic linkages that connect each person 
to his parent and children at some stage of  the life cycle.  In Laitner's model, government- 
mandated transfers between persons who are members of  the same family line are neutral. 
Neutrality of  these transfers holds in Laitner's model, because each person weights his par- 
ent's and child's utility as heavily as his own. It follows that the nonneutrality of  unfunded 
social security in Laitner's model entirely reflects the effects of government-mandated trans- 
fers between persons who are members of  different family lines.  Presumably, a sufficiently 
rich model would capture both the intra-family and inter-family effects of  unfunded social 
security. 
Drawing on our stability analysis, we can also characterize the dynamic capital accu- 
mulation response to nonneutral social security interventions. 
Proposition 6: Consider a one-time, permanent social security intervention in the no-loan 
economy with binding borrowing constraints.  Assume that the initial and new steady- 
state equilibria are stable, regular, and unique. If  the intervention is nonneutral, then.  (per 
capita) capital accumulation is monotonic along the transition path from the initial to the 
new steady-state equilibrium. 
Proof:  (Sketch) The proof is implicit in the preceding discussion. The analysis in sections 
4.b and 4.c  shows that, under the hypotheses of  the proposition, the transition path to a 
steady-state equilibrium is monotonic. It remains only to check that any secondary effects 
of  a social security intervention shift the savings locus in the same direction as the impact 
effect.  For interventions involving changes in an unfunded program, there are no secondary 
effects. For interventions involving changes in a funded program, the wealth effect on the 
savings behavior of  the middle-aged reinforces the impact effect. 
5. The Magnitude of the Response to Social Security Interventions 
A. Descriitr'on of the Numerical Simulation Ezperiments 
In this section, we  parametrize the economy and numerically simulate its dynamic 
response to lump-sum interventions under Regimes A-C. (The dynamic response is trivial 
in Regime D.) The simulations help gauge the magnitudes of  the nonneutralities identified 
above.  They also illustrate how the interact ion between borrowing constraints and inter- generational altruism shape the aggregate savings and welfare response to social security. 
Withidhe  economic environments of  Regimes A-C, we consider funded and unfunded 
social security interventions under polar assumptions about the generational incidence of 
social security  taxes.  Upon introduction  of  an unfunded intervention,  the government 
subsidizes the old and levies taxes on the middle-aged or young in a way  that satisfies 
equation  (19).  Upon introduction of  a funded system at time t, the government levies 
taxes on the middle-aged or young;  benefit  payments commence in period  t + 1 if  the 
middle-aged pay into the system, or in period t +  2 if  only the young pay into the system. 
The path of  the government's budget surplus under a funded intervention is determined 
by substituting equation (18) into the government budget constraint. 
For simplicity, we assume that the economy is initially at a steady-state equilibrium, 
and that the interventions represent unanticipated, permanent changes to the structure of 
the social security program.4 Our numerical simulation technique, described in Appendix 
2, can easily accommodate relaxations of  these assumptions. 
We parameterize the economies as follows:  All of our simulations assume that capital's 
share is equal to .25 in a Cobb- Douglas production function; a lifetime productivity profile 
(al,  aa,  a3)  = (1.5,6.0,2.5);  no government taxes or subsidies at the initial steady state; 
an intervention that introduces an old-age benefit payment equal to 6% of  the old's wage 
income in the initial steady state; a population growth rate, n, equal to (1  + .01)~~  -  1; 
and an intertemporal discount factor, p, equal to .9925. Here, we interpret a period in the 
model as corresponding to twenty-five years. The period utility function is iso-elastic: 
where a equals the intertemporal substitution elasticity in consumption.  Our baseline 
parameter specification assumes a = 215, which accords well with most estimates in the 
empirical literature; see Auerbach and  Kotlikoff  (1987,  pp.  50-51).  In  the borrowing 
4~he  linkage patterns in Regimes A and B imply that the evolution of  the capital stock 
solves an initial value problem.  At time t no agent is connected, at the margin, through 
intergenerational  or capital-market  linkages to consumption levels  in  period t + 2 and 
beyond.  This observation implies, among other things, an identical dynamic response to 
anticipated and unanticipated funded social security interventions under Regimes A and 
B. 
17 constraint economy with operative transfers, we set 7, the interpersonal discount factor, 
- .- 
equal to .l. 
Appendix 3 reports the results of  repeating our simulation exercises for values of the 
intertemporal substitution elasticity that range from 113 to 1, and values of  the interper- 
sonal discount factor that range from .10  to .52.  At least within these ranges, the basic 
messages of  our simulation exercises are not sensitive to the parameter specifications. 
B. The Dynamic Response of  the Capital Stock 
Our reported simulation results highlight the aggregate capital stock response to social 
security interventions.  We  measure the crowding-out ratio t periods after the intervention 
as 
Rt = a(l  + n)2(ko -  kt) ,  t =O  ...  T, 
.06a3Wo 
where a(1  +  n)2ko  equals the (per old person) capital stock in the pre-intervention steady 
state, and .06a3Wo is the size of  the social security benefit (per old person).  A positive 
value for Rt indicates that the capital stock is smaller at t as a result of  the intervention. 
Figures 2-4  illustrate  the dynamic response of  the capital stock  to social security 
interventions under Regimes A-C.  We  measure the capital stock response in terms of  the 
crowding-out ratio defined above.  Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the dynamic response to an 
unfunded social security intervention, assuming, respectively, that the young and middle- 
aged pay all taxes.  Figure 4 illustrates the dynamic response to a funded social security 
intervention, assuming the young pay all taxes.  As  an example of  how  to interpret the 
figures, consider the pure life-cycle case in Figure 2.  According to Figure 2,  the capital 
stock declines in the long run by an amount equal to 43% of  the increase in the benefit 
payment  to the old.  One period after  the intervention, the decline equals 16% of  the 
increase in the benefit payment to the old. 
Four interesting results emerge from Figures 2-4.  First, the crowding-out response to  - 
unfunded social security interventions is small to large in magnitude, ranging (in the long 
run) from 5% to 64% of  the benefit payment. The lower end of  this range corresponds to 
the life-cycle regime in which the middle-aged pay the taxes, and the upper end corresponds 
to the no-transfer/borrowing-constraint  regime with taxes on the middle-aged. 
Second, large crowding-out ratios are fully consistent with altruistic intergenerational Figure 2 
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Crowding-out  ratios for  the baseline specification  described  in the  text. linkages.  In the regime with operative transfers  - and borrowing constraints, the unfunded 
social securityinterventions cause a long-run capital stock decline equal to 58% of the 
old-age benefit payment.  Thus, borrowing constraints imply a quantitatively significant 
departure from Ricardian equivalence. 
Third, the magnitude of the crowding-out response in the regime with operative trans- 
fers and borrowing constraints is closer to the response in the life-cycle regime than the 
response in the Ricardian regime.  Figure 2 indicates that, when the young pay the taxes, 
the crowding-out ratio is moderately  larger in the transfer regime than in the life-cycle 
regime. For sufficiently high values of  the intertemporal substitution elasticity, this ranking 
is reversed.  As Figure 3 indicates, when the middle-aged pay the taxes, the crowding-out 
ratio is much larger in the regime with operative transfers and borrowing constraints than 
in the life-cycle regime. 
Fourth, viewed from the perspective of  either borrowing-constraint regime, life-cycle 
models provide highly misleading implications about the capital stock response to shifts 
in the generational incidence of  social security taxes.  Under an unfunded intervention, a 
shift from taxes on the young to taxes on the middle-aged reduces the crowding-out ratio 
from .43 to .05 in the life-cycle regime. In the operative transfer regime, the shift has no 
effect  (Proposition 6[b]). In the regime with borrowing constraints but no transfers, the 
shift increases the crowding-out ratio from .28 to .64.  Under a funded intervention, social 
security is neutral in all regimes when the middle-aged pay the taxes.  But a shift in taxes 
to the young causes a modest increase in the capital stock when borrowing constraints 
bind. The shift has no effect in the life-cycle scenario. 
In summarizing our results on  the capital stock response to social security  inter- 
ventions, we stress two points.  First, borrowing constraints imply large deviations from 
Ricardian equivalence.  Second, neither Ricardian models nor traditional life-cycle models 
provide good approximations to the aggregate savings effects of social security interventions 
in economies with binding borrowing constraints. 
C. The  Welfare Consequences of  Shifting the Generational Incidence of Taxes 
Hubbard and Judd (1987) develop an argument for shifting the generational incidence 
of  the social security payroll tax from younger to older workers. In a setting with borrow- 
ing constraints and no altruistically motivated intergenerational linkages, the argument is compelling.  An  intertemporal shift in the burden of  payroll taxes from younger to older 
workers mitigates the adverse consequences of borrowing constraints on lifetime welfare. 
We  now investigate whether this argument retains its force in our setup with altruistically 
motivated transfers. 
Consider first the welfare implications of  shifting the generational burden of  social 
security taxes under an unfunded system.  We  know from Proposition  5(d) that the fi- 
nancing regime in an unfunded social security system is fully neutral, if  altruistic transfers 
are positive. Thus, under an unfunded system, shifts in the generational burden of  social 
security taxes yield no welfare gains, despite borrowing constraints on the young. 
While the United States operates a largely unfunded social security system, Hubbard 
and Judd develop their analysis in the context of  a funded system.  Under a funded system, 
the financing regime does affect welfare in the neloan economy. To assess the magnitude 
of  these welfare effects and their sensitivity to altruistic linkages, we use numerical simu- 
lat  ions. 
Figure 5 plots the percentage change in utility associated with shifting the burden 
of  taxation from the middle-aged to the young in a funded system.  The utility changes 
are relative to the outcomes that would have occurred had there been no change in the 
financing regime.  Figure 5 compares the generational welfare response to the financing 
switch for the no-transfer-motive and operative-transfer-motive (7 = .l)  cases.  For  the 
operative-transfer-motive case, the figure illustrates the direct utility effect of  the switch 
on own lifetime consumption and the full utility effect that takes into account the changes 
in descendants' consumption. 
The details of  our numerical simulation are as follows:  At the initial steady state, the 
social security program is financed entirely by  taxes on the middle-aged.  As  a result of 
the unanticipated intervention, which occurs when generation -1 is old, the social security 
program becomes entirely financed by taxes on the young.  The size of  the social security 
program-and all parameter settings are identical to the baseline specification used in our 
previous simulations. Note first that steady-state lifetime welfare rises as a result of shifting 
taxes from the unconstrained middle-aged to the constrained young.  In the long-run, the 
utility gains associated with a larger capital stock more than compensate for the utility 
losses due to less complete consumption smoothing. The long run gains are greater when Figure 5 
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The  intervention occurs under  a funded system when  generation -1  is old. transfer motives operate. 
Consider next the welfare impact on members of  generation 1, who are young when 
the financing switch takes place.  In the no-transfer case, the young bear the full brunt of 
a reduced ability to smooth consumption, but members of  generation 1 benefit little by 
eventual increases in the capital stock. Hence, members of  generation 1 suffqr a relatively 
large utility loss.  Finally, consider the most striking aspect of  Figure 5.  The welfare losses 
suffered by persons who are young when the financing switch occurs are greatly mitigated 
by  an operative altruistic transfer motive. Members of  generation 0, who are middle-aged 
when the financing switch occurs, increase their transfers to young children and thereby 
offset most of  the potential utility losses from taxes on the young.  Thus, from a welfare 
perspective, altruistically motivated transfers within the family serve as a good substitute 
for consumption smoothing  in the market.5 This result  is  reminiscent of  Kotlikoff and 
Spivak's (1981) finding that insurance arrangements within the family can achieve most of 
the welfare gains associated with perfect annuity markets. 
Thus, in the context of a funded system, the force of  Hubbard and Judd's  argument 
for switching the generational burden of  payroll taxes is greatly reduced by an operative 
altruistic transfer motive. In the context of  an unfunded system, altruistic transfers com- 
pletely vitiate the argument for shifting the generational burden of  taxes, as we  noted 
above.  It is worth stresssing that our critique of  the Hubbard and Judd argument relies 
on a small degree of  parental altruism:  in Figure 5, parents weight children's utility only 
10% as heavily as their own. 
One caveat should be borne in mind when interpreting our critique of  Hubbard and 
Judd's argument.  The ability of altruistic linkages within the family to  substitute for an ab- 
sent consumption-loans market, or to offset social security taxes on borrowing-constrained 
young persons, hinges critically on the optimal timing proposition.  Aspects of  the eco- 
nomic environment that mitigate against the timing proposition might also restore some 
of  the force to Hubbard and Judd's  argument.  For example, imperfect annuity markets 
provide parents with incentives to defer transfers, as they await the resolution of  uncer- 
tainty about their own longevity and the longevity of  living ancestors. To the extent that 
5The pattern of  generational welfare effects in Figure 5 holds in the other numerical sim- 
ulations we have conducted with alternative values of a and 7. parents delay transfers, transfers become less useful in smoothing consumption over the 
- 
life cycle.  - 
6.  Two-Sided  Altruism and the Effects of Social Security 
A. A Model with Two-Sided  Altruism 
It is reasonable to ask whether a child-to-parent altruistic gift motive restores intergen- 
erational linkages later in the life cycle and thereby neutralizes social security interventions. 
An operative gift motive clearly implies the neutrality of  social security when capital mar- 
kets are perfect-at issue is whether gift motives imply social security neutrality in the face 
of  borrowing constraints. 
To examine the implications of  a gift motive, we extend the preference specification 
(1) as follows: 
We  follow Abel (1987) in equation (1') and assume that the gift decision is made t.aking 
the gifts of  siblings as given.6 We  also note that p7 5 1  + n is a necessary condition for 
the existence of  a steady-state equilibrium.' 
We  modify the budget constraints for a member of  generation t to include gifts from 
children to parents, denoted by  gi,t-l,  i = 1,2.  Since we  assume borrowing constraints 
bind, Proposition 4 allows us to omit bat and bst. 
6~n  an environment with perfect capital markets and operative intergenerational linkages- 
that is, a.  environment with dynastic families-living persons' treatment of  deceased an- 
cestors' utility calculations bears on both the existence and form of a solution; see Kimball 
(1988).  When  borrowing constraints bind, the dynastic character of  the representative 
person's  problem is destroyed, so that the treatment of  deceased ancestors' utility has no 
bearing on the solution. 
7~f  this condition fails to hold, the transfer motive and gift motive first-order conditions 
contradict each other; see Abel (1987) for elaboration on this point. The new first-order conditions implied by the introduction of a gift motive are 
B. Gifts and the Pattern of  Linkages 
We  now identify the additional linkage patterns that can arise from the introduction 
of  a gift motive.  The following useful proposition follows directly from the intertemporal 
first-order conditions and equation (25). 
Proposition 7: 
(a)  If the gift motive operates, r = $ -  1 in a steady-state equilibrium. 
(b) If  borrowing constraints bind, the gift  motive does  not operate when children are 
young. 
Proposition  7(b) rules out gifts early  in  the life cycle  when  borrowing constraints 
bind.  There remains the question of  whether gifts late in the life cycle can co-exist with 
borrowing constraints. The next two examples answer this question in the affirmative. 
Ezample 1-Binding Borrowing Constraints, Operative Gift Motive, Inoperative Trans- 
fer Motive:  Consider a  parametric version of  the gift-motive economy with log  utility 
and capital's  share equal to .1 in a Cobb-Douglas production function.  Set 7 = n = 0, 
p = 1.0, p = .5,  and (al,  crz, a3)  = (.15, .6, .25). Supposing that the gift motive operates, 
Proposition  7(a) implies that r = 1.  It then follows  that k = -0774, w  = .6968, and 
(1  +  r)k = .1548.  Consider the consumption profile (.1045, .3348, .3348), the savings profile 
(0,.0774), the gift profile (0,.0058), and the transferlbequest profile (0,0,0).  The reader 
can verify that these profiles represent an equilibrium in which borrowing constraints bind 
on the young, the gift motive operates only for the middle-aged, and the transfer motive 
is inoperative. 
Example 2-Binding Borrowing Constraints, Operative Gift Motive, Operative Ransfer 
Motive:  Modify  the previous example by setting 7  = .35.  Consider the consumption 
profile (.1153,.3294,.3294),  the savings profile (0,.0774), the gift profile (0,.0005), and the 
transferlbequest profile (.0108,0,0). The reader can verify that these profiles represent an 
equilibrium in which borrowing constraints bind on the young, the gift motive operates 
only for the middle-aged, and the transfer motive operates only for the middle-aged. In terms of the diagrams introduced in section 3.b, the introduction of  a gift motive 
implies two nxw linkage patterns: 
Additional  Linkage Patt erns with an Operative Gift Motive 
Regime  E. Inop. Trans.  F. Op.  Trans. 
Borr.  Const.  Borr.  Const. 
Op.  Gifts  Op.  Gift 
Time  t  t+lt+2  t  t+l t+2 
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C. Implications of  Gift Motives for the Eflects of  Social Security 
The following proposition states conditions under which social security interventions 
are fully neutral, despite the existence of  binding borrowing constraints. 
Proposition 8: Assume that borrowing constraints bind, and that the gift motive operates. 
(a) Any (small) social security intervention that fails to impinge on the budget constraint 
of  the young is neutral in its impact on capital accumulation, the consumption profile, 
and welfare. 
(b) If  the transfer motive operates, any (small) social security intervention is neutral in 
its steady-state impact on capital accumulation, the consumption profile and welfare. 
Proof:  Part (a) follows  immediately from the linkage diagrams for  Regimes E and F. 
To prove part (b), note from Proposition 9(b) that steady-state aggregate consumption 
(per capita) is  unaffected.  It then follows from the transfer- and gift-motive first-order 
conditions that the steady-state consump  tion profile is unaffected. 
Proposition 8 is entirely in the spirit of  the neutrality results that appear in Propo- 
sition 5 and standard Ricardian neutrality results in environments with operative gift or 
transfer motives and perfect capital markets. The parallel nature of  these results suggests 
a symmetry between the effects of  operative gift motives and the effects of  operative trans- 
fer  motives.  Despite these aspects of  symmetry, an operative gift  motive carries much stronger implications for fiscal policy than an operative transfer motive, when borrowing 
constraints End. As  a corollary to Proposition 7(a), an operative gift motive pins down 
the steady-state interest rate in the face of  any  (small) lump-sum fiscal policy interven- 
tion.  With inelastic labor supply, the level of  the capital stock is also invariant to (small) 
lump-sum fiscal intervent ions.  Thus, 
Proposition 9:  Assume that the gift motive operates. 
(a) Then all (small) social security interventions are neutral in their impact on the steady- 
state interest rate. 
(b) If  labor supply is inelastic, all (small) social security interventions are neutral in their 
impact on the steady-state capital stock. 
An operative gift motive does not imply full neutrality when borrowing constraints 
bind and parent-to-child altruistic transfer motives are inoperative.  In  this case, social 
security interventions that impinge on the budget constraint of  the young affect the shape 
of  the lifetime consumption profile.  (If  we allow for elastic labor supply, they also affect 
aggregate consumption and the capital stock.) As an example, consider an unfunded social 
security intervention financed by  taxes on the young.  The reader can easily verify that 
this intervention affects the shape of  the lifetime consumption profile in Example 1 but 
not in Example 2.  (The key is to observe that unfunded social security interventions are 
isomorphic to a-compensated changes in the shape of  the lifetime productivity profile.) 
Possible effects on consumption notwithstanding, Proposition 9 is a remarkably robust 
neutrality result.  It applies regardless of  whether parent-to-child transfer motives operate 
early  in the life cycle.  It applies regardless of  whether  young  persons  are borrowing- 
constrained. Provided that the gift motive remains operative for the altruists, Proposition 
9 survives the introduction of  non-altruistic agents into the economy.  By  the same to- 
ken, Proposition 9 survives the introduction of  exchange motives (as in Cox  [1987]) for 
intergenerational transfers.  (However, see the discussion in footnote 9 below.) 
To place this surprising neutrality result in perspective, several comments are in or- 
der.  First, Proposition 9 differs in an essential way from the neutrality results that appear 
in Barro (1974), Becker (1974), Bernheim and Bagwell  (1988), Altig and Davis  (1989a), 
and the many related papers in the literature. The neutrality results in the Barro-Becker- ~ernheim/Bagwell  tradition rest upon an extensive interconnected network of  budget con- 
straints.  ~eim,  these neutrality results break down, partially or completely, if  operative 
altruistic linkages are insufficiently pervasive to maintain the fully interconnected network 
of budget constraints.  In contrast, our interest-rate neutrality result follows immediately 
from  the intertemporal and gift-motive f.o.c.'s  of  the middle-aged.8  Thus,  Proposition 
9 directly exploits the properties of  altruistic preferences, unlike neutrality results in the 
Barro-Becker-BernheimIBagwell  tradition, which exploit the implications of altruistic pref- 
erences for connections among budget  constraint^.^ 
Second, in light of  our strong neutrality result, it is natural to inquire whether gift 
motives operate under "reasonablen conditions. In the analytical framework of  this paper, 
it  turns out that equilibria with positive gifts can arise only if  the gift  motive is quite 
strong: 
Proposition 10: p > /3 is a necessary condition for an operative gift motive. 
Proof:  The Inada conditions require a positive interest rate.  Hence,  using Proposition 
7(a), an operative gift motive can occur only when r = (PIP) -  1 > 0. 
Proposition 10 states that children must  care about  their parent's  current  utility 
more than their own future utility for gift motives to operate.  This necessary condition is 
*To the best  of  our knowledge,  Summers  (1982)  and Altig and Davis  (1989b) are the 
only other writers to exploit the first-order conditions in this way to obtain steady-state 
neutrality  results.  Neither of  these papers derive a neutrality result  in  the presence of 
borrowing constraints. 
gProposition 9 fails if  we sufficiently relax the separability assumptions embodied in equa- 
tion (1'). Consider the the general form for preferences 
where we  ignore parental altruism for simplicity.  By  combining the steady-state versions 
of  equations (14) and (25), assuming an operative gift motive, we obtain  . 
Now, in the context of  regime E, consider a social security intervention that impinges on 
the budget constraint of  the young. If  u41 # 0, then interest-rate neutrality fails to hold. 
But, note that either intertemporal or interpersonal separability implies u41 = 0. Even if 
~41  is  nonzero, interest-rate determination in our framework is radically different than in 
Ricardian and life-cycle models.  We  thank Jim Davies for directing our attention to the 
separability assumption that underlies Proposition 9. a strong one, and it might prompt one to dismiss Proposition 9 as a theoretical curiosity. 
This disdsd  would be inappropriate. In Altig and Davis (1989b), we show that analogs 
to Proposition 9 hold in environments with quite modest degrees of  altruism and small 
imperfections in the consumption-loans market.  Thus, Proposition 9 is one example of  a 
class of  interest-rate neutrality theorems that hold in environments with altruistic linkages 
and capital market imperfections. 
7. Concluding Remarks 
The interaction between capital market imperfections and intergenerational altruism 
carries important implications for the life-cycle timing of  intergenerational transfers and 
for the response of  the interest rate, capital stock, and lifetime consumption profiles to 
social security interventions.  Our analysis provides a thorough characterization of  these 
implications when capital market imperfections take the form of  borrowing constraints on 
the young and altruistic preferences do not engender strategic behavior. However, several 
important questions remain open. 
First, given the frequently strong results in this paper, it is natural to ask whether 
they survive in environments with milder imperfections in the consumption-loans market. 
In Altig and Davis (1989b), we consider environments with intergenerational altruism and 
small imperfections in the capital market.  The imperfections take the form of  a wedge 
between borrowing and lending rates that stems from the asymmetric tax treatment of 
interest  income and interest  payments on  consumption loans.  The timing  proposition 
survives completely intact in this environment, and the interest-rate neutrality proposition 
emerges in an even more powerful form. Surprisingly, however, a dichotomy arises between 
the short-run and long-run capital accumulation responses to social security when altruistic 
linkages are present.  In  the short run, an unfunded social security program- crowds out 
capital just as in the no-loan economy of  this paper, but eventually the economy returns 
to the in'itial-equilibrium capital intensity. 
Second, we abstracted from individual uncertainty about lifetime earnings and longevity. 
Coupled with less-than-perfect insurance and annuity markets, these factors imply incen- 
tives for altruistic parents to defer transfers to children, even borrowing-constrained chil- 
dren, as they await the resolution of  uncertainty.  Thus, uncertainty about earnings and longevity mitigates against the optimal timing proposition.  Furthermore, to the extent 
that social security influences the magnitude of  precautionary savings  in  an uncertain 
environment, the argument underlying our interest-rate neutrality proposition may be un- 
dercut. While we have yet to formally address these issues, straightforward modifications 
of  our analytical framework provide a useful vehicle for doing so.  Issues associated with 
annuity market  imperfections, for example, are easily introduced into our framework by 
assuming that persons face uncertainty about whether they live for two or three periods. 
In future research, we hope to determine how the interaction among borrowing constraints, 
imperfect annuity markets, and altruistically motivated intergenerational linkages shapes 
the aggregate savings and welfare response to social security programs. 
Finally, much recent research focuses on strategic aspects of  altruistically motivated 
interpersonal  transfers.  See  Bernheim and Stark  (1988), Bruce and Waldman  (1988), 
Lindbeck and Weibull (1988), and Kotlikoff, Razin and Rosenthal (1988). The Samaritan's 
dilemma modelled by the first three sets of  authors cannot arise in our framework with 
binding borrowing constraints and parental altruism only.  Since parents want borrowing- 
constrained children  to consume the entire transfer, over-consumption by  the young is 
not an issue.  There is scope for the Samaritan's dilemma in the gift-motive economy we 
consider, because parents might over-consume during middle-age to elicit larger gifts from 
children during old age. By ignoring this possibility in section 6, we implicitly assumed the 
existence of  a technology or device that enables children to credibly precommit when young 
to a certain level of  gifts when middle-aged.  We  believe, however, that this assumption 
is inessential to the derivation of  steady-state interest  rate neutrality in the gift motive 
economy.  Only the exact form-and not the essential nature-of  the intertemporal and 
interpersonal first-order conditions underlying interest-rate neutrality seems to depend on 
whether parents engage in this type of  strategic behavior. 
In contrast, strategic behavior in  a framework  of  cooperative bargaining between  - 
altruistic parents and children is likely to undercut the interest-rate neutrality proposition. 
This conjecture is based on the observation, stressed by Kotlikoff, Razin and Rosenthal, 
that government  redistributions alter the strategic postures  (that is,  threat points) of 
parents and children in a cooperative bargaining framework, and that strategic postures 
in turn influence the magnitude of  net transfers. Whether the optimal timing carries over  directly to a cooperative bargaining framework  is not clear, but the factors 
underlying Shetiming result in our noncooperative environment would seem to be present 
in a cooperative environment as well. Appendix 1-Proof To Proposition 5 
- 
Part  (a).%  this intervention, T3t = -(1  + rt+2)T2t. Using (20)-(22), the time t + 1 
partial equilibrium response of  savings by  the middle-aged is  -s1T2t + (1  + rt+2)~2T2t  = 
T2t[(l  + rt+2)s2 -  sl]  = -T2t.  But  from (23) and the government budget constraint, 
government savings rises by T2t. Hence, the net effect on aggregate savings is nil. 
Part  (b):  Consider a shift in the financing of  a funded social security system from 
taxes on the middle-aged to taxes on the young.  Since we  want to deduce the steady- 
state effect of  this intervention, assume that it has been in operation for more than one 
period as of  t +  1.  Using the government budget constraint, and the steady-state condition 
Tlt = Tl,t+l, the accumulation of  capital between t + 1 and t +  2 obeys 
in the no-transfer economy, 
in the transfer economy. 
Now,  calculate the partial equilibrium effect of  the increase in T1,t+l on aggregate 
savings at t + 1: 
(1 + rt+l)sl + (1  + n) > 0,  in the no-transfer economy; 
slrt+l +  1  + (1 -  sl)n > 0,  in the transfer economy. 
We  can use this result to determine how the savings locus shifts. Differentiate the savings 
locus, holding kt+1 constant, to obtain 
By  the regularity assumption, this expression exceeds zero.  Hence, the intervent  ion shifts 
the savings locus A upwards in Figure 1, and the steady-state capital stock rises.  Com- 
bining this result with the neutrality result in part (a) proves part (b). 
Part  e:  Consider an unfunded intervention financed by  taxes on the middle-aged. 
That is, Tlt = 0 and T3t = -(I+ n)Tz,t+1. Using the steady-state condition T2,t+1 = T2t and the aggregate savings function, we obtain the partial equilibrium effect on savings in 
both economies: 
using (21). Differentiating the aggregate savings locus for a fixed kt+l, yields 
using the regularity assumption. 
When the unfunded intervention is financed by taxes on the young, the partial equi- 
librium response of  aggregate savings is given by 
(1 + n)2s2  < 0,  in the no- transfer economy; 
-  (1  + n)sl + (1  + n)2s2  < 0,  in the transfer economy. 
Differentiating the aggregate savings locus as before, and using the regularity assumption, 
yields 
dkt+2/dTl,t+2 < 0. This proves part (c). 
Part d:  Compare the partial equilibrium savings responses for the two different meth- 
ods of  financing an unfunded system.  In  the no-loan economy, (1 + n)dSt+l/i3T2,t+l < 
dSt+l/aTl,t+2, so that a shift to taxes on the young, for a fixed old-age benefit, increases 
the capital stock.  In  the loan economy, (1 + n)aSt+l/aT2,t+l = i3St+l/dTl,t+2, SO  that 
the generational incidence of  the tax is irrelevant. Appendix 2-Numerical Simulation Technique 
- - 
Our numerical simulation technique is the same as the one used in  Auerbach and 
Kotlikoff (1987). The procedure involves the following steps.  (1) At the pre-intervention 
steady-state equilibrium (t = 0)  ,  calculate the aggregate capital stock, government debt, 
consumption loans, and the asset holdings for representative members of  each cohort. This 
step essentially involves solving a system of  equations that can be reduced to one nonlinear 
equation in one unknown, k.  (2) Calculate the post-intervention steady-state equilibrium, 
and assume that the economy converges to the post-intervention steady-state after T < oo 
periods.  (3) Conjecture a time path, {k,O)?=,,  for the capital stock, constraining the path 
to pass through the steady-state values calculated in step one.  (4) Given the factor prices 
implied by the conjectured path for k (and given agents' initial pattern of  asset holdings), 
solve the consumers' problems to obtain time paths for transfers, consumption, and  saving. 
(5) Aggregate the solutions to the consumers' problems to obtain the implied time path for 
k, {R,O>T=,.  (6) Construct a new path {k:}T=-,  where k:  = 6kf + (1 -  6)@ for t = 0,. .  .T, 
and 0 < 6 < 1.  (7) Using the new  path for k,  repeat steps (3)-(6) to obtain {k;)T=,, 
n = 2,. .  ..  Continue until, for all t E [0, TI,  lk;  -  %;I  <  a. Appendix 3-Furt  her Simulation Results 
-  - 
This appendix describes how  our numerical simulation results are affected by vary- 
ing 7 and a. We  first discuss the rationale for varying the degree of  altruism with the 
intertemporal substitution elasticity. 
The smaller the intertemporal substitution elasticity, the greater the desire to "flattenn 
the life-cycle consumption profile. In a pure life-cycle scenario, consumption smoothing is 
implemented entirely through the capital market, that is, savings decisions. With an altru- 
istic preference specification, another consumption-smoothing device potentially operates: 
intergenerational  transfers.  Consumption-smoothing within the family can supplement 
or displace consumption-smoothing through the capital market.  The two consumption- 
smoothing  devices are (imperfect) substitutes, so that a greater desire to smooth con- 
sumption increases the scope for an operative  transfer  motive.  By  the same token,  a 
greater degree of  altruism reduces the scope for an active consumption-loans market. See 
Altig and Davis (1989a) for further discussion on this point. 
Table A1 illustrates the interaction between the consumption-loans market  (or bor- 
rowing constraints) and the operativeness of  the transfer motive.  The interaction effects 
are quite dramatic.  Transfer motives are inoperative for values of  7 as large as .45 when 
utility is  logarithmic.  For  the same value of  7, transfer  motives are strong enough to 
overcome borrowing restrictions for values of  a as large as 213.  When a equals 112, the 
transfer motive operates for values of 7 as small as .15. Since we are interested in scenarios 
that fall under Regime B, we vary a and 7 simultaneously to ensure that these equilibria 
obtain. 
Under alternative assumptions about these parameters, Tables A2-A4 show the long- 
run crowding-out  ratios associated  with  the social security interventions considered in 
Figures 1-3.  The most pronounced effect of  varying the intertemporal substitution elas- 
ticity occurs  in the context  of  unfunded  interventions in  the life-cycle  regime:  smaller  - 
intertemporal substitution elasticities significantly reduce the crowding-out ratio.  This 
result occurs because government-imposed intergenerational redistributions have little im- 
pact on the lifetime consumption profile when individuals have a strong desire to smooth 
consumption intertemporally and have access to perfect capital markets. The importance 
of  access to capital markets is easily seen by noting that the crowding-out ratio is not very 
33 sensitive to the intertemporal substitution elasticity when borrowing constraints bind. 
- - Notes:  I indicates that borrowing constraints bind and transfers are zero. 
0 indicates that borrowing constraints bind and transfers are positive. 
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Table A2: Crowding-out Ratios: Tax on Young 
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Table A4: Crowding-out Ratio: Tax on Young 
Funded Social Security Intervention 
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